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 Abstract 
 
Orthodox accounts of the British Labour governments in power between 1945 and 1951 are              
mistaken in presenting the government’s management of the sterling crises as having been             
apolitical and pragmatic. This thesis compares the effects of Britain’s sterling area policies             
on Britain and the British Empire more widely, in order to evaluate the consequences of               
their domestic social democratic reforms and the reconstruction of the wider British            
economy beyond the British experience. Contra orthodox historians of the period, the Attlee             
governments’ economic policy was deeply political in its design, implementation and          
consequences, subordinating the needs of colonial peoples to those of Britain in both design              
and practice. The British government relied on political control over the sterling area to              
obtain finance from the colonies at non-market rates. Without these loans, the Attlee             
governments may have had to have cut domestic expenditure or make greater political             
concessions to the USA in return for more American aid. Policies were implemented to              
mobilise colonial resources whose export would have a positive effect on the balance of              
payments crises. Although in some colonies this export drive laid the groundwork for             
economic development, in colonies where development projects were poorly implemented,          
particularly in West Africa, the benefits were not mutual. Furthermore, the Attlee            
governments effectively “outsourced” austerity to the colonies, resulting in shortages of           
goods and capital drain. This was achieved through their political control over the terms of               
trade in the sterling area. The negative effects of their policies on colonial living standards               
were known and contested, and ran counter to the Labour Party’s espoused socialist             
principles. However, ideological beliefs about race and the role of Britain in the world order               
may have influenced government decisions to protect British people at the expense of             
dependent colonies, and the Empire’s undemocratic political structure permitted it. That           
austerity measures in the colonies bear the hallmarks of measures for economic discipline             
traditionally employed in the 1920s and 1930s suggests that Attlee’s brand of social             
democracy did not transform the nature of capitalism to the extent that it may have               
appeared from a British perspective.   
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Labour governments in power between 1945 and 1951, led by Prime Minister Clement              
Attlee, have been widely praised for transforming Britain into a social democracy – a ‘New               
Jerusalem’ – despite the turbulence of the immediate years following World War II (WWII)              
(Cairncross 1985; Morgan 1984; Thompson 2006). Britain’s first majority Labour          
government, elected on a radical social democratic manifesto in 1945 and again in 1950,              
Attlee's governments have been credited with kickstarting Britain’s economic recovery and           
for introducing a series of social reforms which would provide a social safety net for the                
British population, some of which remain in place to this day, such as the National Health                
Service.  
However, it is less common to associate Attlee’s governments with the British Empire.             
When the Labour government came to power in 1945, they gained political control not only               
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but of an Empire spanning a significant portion of the               
world. The extent of control that could be exerted from Westminster varied across the              
Empire, however, Attlee’s governments were to decide the role that the British Empire             
would play in the post-war world. While the Attlee governments are associated with the              
British withdrawal from India and the beginnings of decolonisation, the Empire has been             
criticised for being a vehicle for the exploitation of colonial workforces, and such a position               
would appear to run counter to the ideals of an avowedly socialist government. 
This short but significant period of British history has long provided a benchmark             
against which social democratic governments and opposition governments have been          
measured. It is not immediately obvious that a reappraisal of social democracy and its             
relation to imperialism is warranted in 2019; indeed, much has been written about the              
‘death of social democracy’ in the 21​st​ century, a time when a neoliberal economic             
consensus is ascendant over Europe (Elton 2015; Lavelle 2016). In fact, there has not been a                
social democratic government in Britain since Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979.           
However, in Britain, where austerity measures have been in action since the 2008 financial              
crisis, there has been a wave of nostalgia for the 1945 Labour government and its               
commitment to securing the welfare of British citizens. When Jeremy Corbyn became leader             
of the Labour Party in 2015, on a mandate to return the party to its radical left-wing roots,                  
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 the successes of the Attlee government were presented as the benchmark for him to be               
judged against. This pride and nostalgia are encapsulated in Ken Loach’s 2013 film about the             
Attlee years, called ​The Spirit of ’45​. Corbyn’s Labour party achieved relative success as an              
opposition party in Britain’s 2017 election, in which Labour presented a manifesto outlining             
their intention to roll out a social democratic programme in the vein of Attlee’s government.               
Since the legacy of Attlee’s government is drawn upon in the present day as evidence of                
social democracy’s potential to deliver prosperity and justice, there remains a reason to             
shed light on the role the British Empire played in this.  
There is a wealth of literature surrounding the Attlee governments’ time in office,             
critically evaluating their domestic reforms, foreign policy and their management of           
successive economic crises. Since the moment they left office in 1951, there has been a               
diversity of opinions on their legacy, ranging from left-wing critics rueing the governments’             
failure to spark a genuine socialist revolution in Britain, to right-wingers accusing Labour of              
rendering the British working class dependent on “the nipple of state maternalism” (Barnett           
1986). However, by the mid-1980s, something of an orthodoxy had developed amongst            
historians of the Attlee governments, largely favourable to the governments for having            
established social democracy in Britain in unlikely circumstances (Cairncross 1985; Pelling           
1984; Hennessy 2006; Morgan 1984). Many scholars have praised their effectiveness in            
achieving domestic goals of economic recovery, full employment and instituting the welfare            
state. They emphasise the effectiveness of novel government intervention in the economy –             
a flexible and “pragmatic” approach to economic management.   
There has been much debate amongst these authors over the question of the success              
of the reforms of these governments judged against the compromises they made, and their              
reforms’ legacy in the 20​th Century. However, the interpretation of the Attlee governments             
as successfully implementing social democracy despite countervailing circumstances        
underlies Loach’s film. It remains prevalent in the socialist imaginary, and is arguably the              
dominant understanding of this government in Britain today. It feeds into national            
self-understanding and projects for social democracy. This thesis will present and           
interrogate the logic underlying this interpretation. Thompson’s account of the Attlee years            
(Thompson 2006), itself indebted to Cairncross’s “authoritative account” (Cairncross 1985),        
encapsulates the reasoning that underlies this orthodox interpretation. In the following           
section I will present this orthodoxy and the most common ways that it has been disputed. 
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 Chapter 2: Background and the state of the debate 
 
2.1 Social democracy in Britain: From cradle to grave 
Tomlinson describes the Attlee governments’ twin objectives as “social justice and economic           
efficiency” (Tomlinson 2006: 2). There was broad consensus in the Labour Party on these             
domestic objectives throughout both Attlee governments. During the War, the coalition           
government successfully coordinated British industry and commerce. The success of this           
centralised economic planning gave Attlee’s Labour party confidence that these tactics           
could be redeployed to a social end, and that the disastrous economic decline brought on by                
the end of the World War I (WWI) could be avoided. Instead, government intervention in               
the economy could ensure both economic reconstruction and access to health, education,            
work and pensions; social reform would be built on the back of a thriving economy               
(Tomlinson 2006: 21). The government looked to build a new, more equitable model of             
capitalism which would provide a “Third Way” between the ascendant forms of American             
capitalism and Soviet Communism. The party was confident that socialist principles of            
equality could be successfully married to liberal democracy. 
As a party of social democracy, Labour understood themselves as representatives of the             
working class, pledging to raise domestic living standards through a programme of reforms             
built on the recommendations of the Beveridge Report, published during the war,           
guaranteeing the state’s protection ‘from cradle to grave’ (Beveridge 1942). The reforms            
implemented during the Attlee years included universal child allowances, unemployment          
insurance, a minimum subsistence income and the NHS. Labour’s manifesto for the 1945             
election cited the previous Conservative governments’ record of cutting social provisions in           
the period between the World Wars, and promised plans for economic efficiency such as           
“full employment and the highest possible industrial efficiency” (Labour Party 1945) as a             
means of preventing such cuts under a Labour government. The reforms were also            
underpinned by a progressive and high personal taxation level. This taxation was shown to              
be compatible with economic growth and record levels of investment, which increased by             
almost 60% between 1946 and 1952 (Thompson 2006: 145). Many of the welfare reforms,              
including the establishment of the NHS, were introduced during the first term in office, and               
in 1950 the Attlee government was re-elected on a similar manifesto, pledging to continue              
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 to increase production and maintain full employment (Labour Party 1950). However, in            
1951, the Labour party lost to the opposition Conservative party in a snap election, marking               
the end of the Attlee government and the start of a 13-year long period of Conservative                
rule.  
 
2.2 Economic crises: a “pragmatic” response 
Britain’s economy emerged from WWII bearing the severe scars of the war, as did much of                
Western Europe. War had physically destroyed much fixed capital and severed established            
trading links, depriving British finance of the invisible earnings on global trade which had              
proved lucrative before WWII. British industry was also on a war footing, with much              
productive output geared towards wartime needs. Overall loss of capital was equivalent to             
18.6% of Britain’s pre-war wealth (Howlett 2004: 24). In​ ​contrast, ​ ​geographically ​ ​removed​            
​from​ ​the​ ​main​ ​theatres​ ​of​ ​the​ war,​ ​the ​ ​USA​ ​entered ​ ​the​ ​post-war​ ​period​ ​with ​ ​an ​ ​expanded​                
​industrial​ ​capacity, stimulated by demand for goods unprocurable throughout much of the          
world where war had ruptured established supply chains. ​ ​The global production of essential             
goods was thus concentrated in the USA, yet due to reduced productive capacities, Britain,              
and most other developed nations, were running a trade deficit with the USA, causing a               
balance of payments crisis. Access to essential goods became dependent on access to             
American currency to pay for it, and with the dollar linked to the gold standard, the dollar                 
became increasingly scarce, causing a global dollar shortage (Sutton 2015).  
Whilst Britain tried to satisfy demand for consumer goods from within the sterling area              
– a monetary union comprising Britain, its independent dominions and dependent colonies            
– and hence avoid spending dollars, it still relied on trade with the USA. That the British                 
Empire’s Dominions – Australia, New Zealand and South Africa – were also in a trade deficit                
meant that the sterling area as a whole faced persistent balance of payments crises, where               
the drain of gold to the USA threatened to undermine the value of the pound sterling.                
Although the USA provided financial aid to Britain in order to reduce the balance of               
payments deficit in the form of the Marshall Plan, the balance of payments crises still               
occurred throughout the Attlee years. 
Orthodox accounts of the Attlee years consider the governments’ management of           
these crises to have been a success. The British economy recovered from WWII relatively              
swiftly and successfully, especially in comparison to the British experience of the end of              
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 WWI, where demobilisation and financial crises brought on the Great Depression, lasting            
throughout the 1930s. In the years the Attlee governments were in power, GNP increased             
by over 15%, and the economy easily absorbed demobilised soldiers, with the civilian labour              
force increasing by over 40% between 1945 and 1946 (Kitson 2004: 21). The renowned              
programme of nationalisation of key industries was an immediate success, with industrial            
production increasing by over a third in the seven years following the end of WWII               
(Thompson 2006: 145). Thompson cites the governments’ industrial strategy as having had            
a significant impact on Britain's economic recovery, with the government researching what            
the US market demanded, steering British industry towards meeting those demands, and            
ensuring sufficient resources and manpower for these industries (Thompson 2006: 145). In         
addition, the government put restrictions on imports from the USA and sourced alternative             
resources from the sterling area. Thompson describes a “fairly steep underlying trend            
towards equilibrium”, with the balance of payments with the dollar area reaching            
equilibrium around 1952 (Thompson 2006: 145). It was predicted that in order to reach              
equilibrium, Britain would have to export 75% more to the dollar area than they had before                
in 1938; exports had risen by 77% by 1950, outperforming their target. Britain’s post-war              
economic recovery is widely regarded as a success, with the governments having weathered             
the storm. 
This economic success has largely been attributed to the Attlee governments’ mixture            
of inherited wartime controls over goods and manpower, and new methods of Keynesian             
economic management, specifically the manipulation of aggregate demand. Thompson         
argues that “the Labour government had shown that a mixed economy could be run in such                
a way as to achieve full employment, historically high rates of economic growth, rising living               
standards and relative economic stability” (Thompson 2006: 146). The governments’          
relationship with Keynesian economic policy was not concrete, and many prominent figures            
in the party (including Attlee himself) favoured a greater role for the government in the               
economy through direct controls on the distribution of manpower and resources. However,            
by 1948, economic policy showed a strong Keynesian influence, and the Chancellor of the              
Exchequer’s speech in 1948 signalled a commitment to using monetary and fiscal policy to              
counteract inflationary pressures and the sterling crises (Thompson 2006: 141).  Direct          
controls inherited from the war years were gradually abandoned, culminating in a “bonfire             
of controls” in 1948, from which point the price mechanism played a greater role in the                
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 economy (Thompson 2006: 140). The apparent success of the mixture of government            
planning with a market economy in bringing about economic efficiency, and laying the             
groundwork for social justice, has helped form a strong association between social            
democracy and Keynesianism. 
In this way, the Attlee governments have been praised in orthodox interpretations as             
having put economic pragmatism before ideological beliefs. Although a guiding policy           
objective was to create a more socially just world, the Attlee governments understood that              
social reform was contingent on an efficiently functioning economy (Tomlinson 1997: 66).            
Measures such as austerity and import restrictions in the face of ongoing shortages helped              
give the governments’ economic policy a reputation for pragmatism and Tomlinson praises            
the governments for not following a path “pre-determined” by ideological belief, which may             
have threatened the British economy’s recovery. Furthermore, Thompson (2006: 142) notes           
that as technical knowledge of economics was required to make use of the Keynesian              
toolkit, economists played an increasingly prominent role in the government, proffering           
solutions to Britain’s economic problems which informed government policy. The role of            
expert economists in the governments’ management of the economy may have furthered            
their reputation for putting pragmatism before politics. Orthodox historians have          
understood the Attlee governments’ economic policies as technical and apolitical, making           
the economy run more efficiently to the nation’s benefit, rather than simply pursuing a              
programme of redistribution according to ideological principle (Heinlein 2002: 187). 
In comparison to post-WWI Britain, better living standards and mild austerity measures,            
along with the long-lasting welfare implementations, provided residents of Britain -           
particularly the working class - with unprecedented levels of security and reason to believe              
that quality of life would only continue to improve. Thus, the Attlee governments’ economic            
model has been used as proof that a capitalist economy can be managed in such a way as to                  
navigate times of economic crisis without worsening standards of living for the poor but              
while bringing about a general rise in living standards (Pettifor 2009; Thompson 2006: 146). 
 
2.3 Critiquing the orthodoxy: Ripe for reappraisal? 
There have been numerous accounts of the Attlee years that conflict with the orthodox              
interpretation. Many critics argue that the British Empire played a greater role than has              
been acknowledged in the orthodox account. King claims that Labour’s manifesto for the            
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 1945 election, entitled ‘Let Us Face the Future’ “reads like a prospective history of the               
post-war period” (King 1975). It is notable, however, that Labour’s plans for the Empire are               
afforded only one sentence in the manifesto.    
When Labour came to power in 1945, Britain was at the head of a globe-spanning               
Empire, comprising independent Dominions, dependent colonies and protectorates. While         
the Empire began to disintegrate in earnest under the Attlee governments, few Labour             
politicians sensed that the Empire would soon disintegrate. When India was granted            
independence, it was not assumed that other parts of the Empire would follow suit; the               
government assumed that the West African and Caribbean colonies were generations away            
from independence (Gupta 2002b: 275; Saville 1993: 20). The idea was that, under             
Labour’s tutelage, the British Empire would differ to the imperialism of old. The British             
Empire was integrated into the Labour governments’ economic plans in the form of the              
sterling area. The vision was that the sterling area would become a self-sufficient             
arrangement between industrialised and primary economies, united by a common currency           
(Tomlinson 1997: 28). The Fabian Society, a group of politicians and theorists with a social               
democratic strand of thought influential within the Labour Party, was optimistic that British             
expertise could rationalise and accelerate economic development in the colonies (Gupta           
2002c). Labour understood themselves to be bringing about a fair, mutually beneficial            
relationship; that the British Empire would become a vehicle for social justice on a global               
scale (Gupta 2002b; Hinds 2001: 42).  
Many criticisms of Attlee’s governments have come from Marxist historians and           
commentators, many of whom viewed this social democratic governments’ dalliance with           
imperialism as being rooted in the nature of capitalism. These views were influenced by the              
seminal writings of Hobson, Luxembourg and Lenin on the necessary relation between            
capitalism and imperialism. Lenin warns that socialism in one nation is tantamount to a              
compromise between a nation’s capitalist ruling class, and a “labour aristocracy”, which put             
pressure on the government to employ protectionist measures and to suppress the            
industries of colonised nations to the advantage of the metropole’s working class.  This            
account of ​social imperialism continues to underlie Marxist critiques of the Attlee            
governments’ legacy to the present day (Crimes of Britain 2018; Saville 1993) accusing them              
of employing their political power over the Empire to secure better living standards for the               
British population, at the expense of colonial peoples. 
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 The Indian historian Gupta addresses the social imperialism thesis and argues that this            
was not the case (Bayley 2002). His archival work looks for evidence of the motivations               
behind Labour Party policy, and the attitudes towards the Empire of the working classes              
more widely (Gupta 2002b; Gupta 2002c). He argues that the Empire was not a primary               
market for UK goods at this point, neither were its resources destined for the metropole,               
that there is little evidence of protectionism being pushed for by Unions, and little direct               
competition between metropolitan and peripheral manufacturers. He claims that British          
welfare was financed by British people and the USA. He gives a convincing account of the               
competing ideologies within the Labour party and provides evidence to dispel the idea that            
under Labour, Britain’s economic exploitation of the Empire was predominantly mercantilist           
or corresponding to Lenin’s ideal type of social imperialism. The Leninist account of             
imperialism therefore does little to explain how the Empire could have been economically             
beneficial to Britain during the Attlee years. 
However, these rebukes to the social imperialism critiques fail to take into            
consideration an alternative way the British Empire could be exploited for financial gain by              
the metropole: through the management of the pound sterling. In the wake of Cain and               
Hopkins’ ​British Imperialism: 1688-1914 (Cain and Hopkins 2016)​, where the authors          
analysed Britain’s imperial history with relation to the financial class,​ ​numerous authors           
have applied this framework to the Attlee years. They argue that the successive British              
governments managed the economy in order to retain a strong pound, and that this was               
primarily to the benefit of British financiers, and in many cases to the detriment of the                
British Empire’s colonies (Hinds 2001: 195; Krozewski 2001: 209). These more recent surveys             
of the governments’ management of the sterling crises have tended to be critical, with              
Tomlinson describing it as “a significant failure of policy for democratic socialist            
government” (Tomlinson 1997: 67). However, Krozewski acknowledges that this work does        
not go as far as examining the necessity of monetary policy for the Attlee governments’               
social democratic domestic policies (Krozewski 2001: 8).  
Orthodox accounts tend to view Labour as presiding over a weakened empire in             
terminal decline (Hennessey 2006), and, while not necessarily blind to the potential            
implications of British imperialism, the consequences of Labour’s policy on Empire is not             
deemed significant enough to tarnish their achievements as social democrats. For these            
historians, whatever the strains of imperialism in the mindset of certain sections of the              
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 Labour Party (notably the Fabians), there is little reason to assume that social democratic              
reforms were only possible because of the subjugation of colonial peoples. It is worth noting               
that such conclusions are largely reached without an in-depth exploration of the            
implications of Labour policy on areas of the Empire that it affected, beyond relations              
between colonial governments and nationalist elements in the colonies. Gupta provides an            
exception to this in his 1975 work ​British Imperialism and the Labour Party​, written before               
many of the orthodox histories referenced. However, written at a time when many key              
government records remained classified, and before the ideological ascent of Monetarism           
brought the implications of monetary policy into the academic discourse, some of his             
analysis suffers from deductive speculation; the foreword to the Second Edition, published            
in 2002, argues that “Gupta’s claim that sterling management policies were not unduly             
unfair on the colonies is ripe for reappraisal, given the insights gained in the intervening               
years. His failure to recognise the significance of the British-led export drives in the colonies               
must be considered an oversight.” (Bayley 2002) 
The New Imperial School presents an indirect challenge to orthodox accounts of the             
Attlee period. Influenced by the cultural turn brought about by postcolonial studies, the last              
30 years has seen the publication of numerous works taking a decentered approach to the            
history of the British Empire . Rather than viewing British policymakers and a selection of              1
colonial nationalists as the key protagonists of British imperial history, they examine how             
imperialism manifested itself in different ways in different locations. They look to map             
the ‘spider’s web’ of flows between and within colonised and colonising nations, sometimes           
but not always mediated by the Empire as an institution. This undermines the             
methodological approach used by orthodox historians of the Attlee period. The           
domestic/foreign policy dichotomy implicit in orthodox analyses of the time allows the            
analysis of the governments to be limited to the effects of policy within British borders. As a                 
result, reading the history of the Attlee period in conjunction with the networked approach              
requires examination of the consequences of their policies for all those subject to it.  
Historians writing from the perspective of the New Imperial School have often            
emphasised how matters of culture or identity have intersected with Britain’s colonial            
history. In recent years, Shilliam (2018) and Bhambra (2017b) have brought cultural analyses             
of the Empire into dialogue with analyses of political economy, arguing that matters of              
1 See Curless et al. (2015) for a comprehensive review. 
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 identity – especially race – have been used as grounds for inclusion or exclusion from the                
benefits of the British Empire. Shilliam argues that orthodox histories of the welfare state              
have neglected how racial ideology has historically informed policy, and the effects of policy              
on race (Shilliam 2018). This thesis builds on his analysis of how racist ideas informed the                
construction of the welfare state, applying it more specifically to the management of the              
sterling area in the Attlee years. 
The idea that the Attlee governments were successful in pursuing their social            
democratic aims relies on a selective interpretation of this time in history. It is             
Britain-centric and emphasises how the government was successful in bringing about British           
economic recovery and transforming the domestic economy into a new type of           
capitalism. However, the national perspective is ahistorical in that there was no           
constitutional distinction between inhabitants of the British Isles and the inhabitants of the             
dependent colonies in terms of citizenship. Britain was one node of a far larger              
politico-economic network (Bhambra 2017a: 220). The constitutional relations between        
Britain and its colonies were often ambiguous, with it not necessarily being written in law               
the exact political relationship that a colony had with the British metropole. However, prior            
to 1948, all inhabitants of Britain, their colonies and their independent dominions were             
‘British Subjects’. In the British Nationality Act of 1948, the Attlee government made all              
peoples living in its colonies ‘Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ (Bhambra 2017b:             
4), to distinguish them from citizens of independent dominions, in response to the             
dominions introducing their own citizenship laws. The governments’ acknowledgement of          
colonial subjects as within the same citizenship status as those from Britain itself (British              
Nationality Act 1948, part 1.1.2) suggests that their own interpretation of the notion of              
Britishness was not limited to the British Isles alone.  
The ways in which the economic system was steered to benefit Britain will be              
presented according to three aspects – management of the sterling balances, colonial            
development and export drives, and outsourcing austerity to the dependent colonies. While            
this allows the multifaceted nature of the sterling area system to be better understandable,              
the reader should be aware of the artificiality of this division. Policymakers did not              
necessarily treat these aspects in isolation from each other but saw them as bound up in the                 
question of how to support the sterling area’s balance of payments with the dollar area.  
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 For each aspect, I will discuss the Attlee governments’ policies for the sterling area, and               
then analyse the effects of these policies on Britain and other parts of the sterling area as                 
well as the political process behind their implementation. This will allow direct comparisons             
to demonstrate how British living standards were dependent on and differed to colonial             
experience. It will give insight into how the British Empire functioned as a transnational              
network of flows and allow us to judge what might determine whether someone’s inclusion              
into this network would be beneficial to them, and how matters of identity, such as race and                 
class, could affect this. It can also give insight into how it was that Attlee’s Labour party                 
were able to introduce dramatic, and expensive, social reforms at a time when classical              
economics may have cautioned for fiscal discipline. This can allow us to form a clearer               
picture of the circumstances in which policies aimed at improving living standards            
domestically can be implemented.   
While the component parts of this research question have been addressed within the             
literature, the literature is lacking research which integrates both the comparative effects of             
the Attlee governments’ sterling area policies across the British Empire, and how the sterling              
area policies related to the governments’ projects for social democracy in Britain. The last              
25 years of imperial historiography have provided insights into the ideology behind the             
Attlee governments’ policies, as well as a new interpretation of the detrimental effects             
these supposedly pragmatic policies had on colonial living standards. This research will            
contribute to the literature by systematically assessing the costs of British post-war social             
democracy across the British Empire, taking these new insights into account. This can give us               
a clearer picture of how social democracy, like any other system, may produce winners and               
losers; by including the population of the Empire as a whole into the analysis, it will be                 
possible to give a more accurate portrayal of who the winners and losers of this system                
were. 
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 Chapter 3: An account of the Attlee governments’ management of the           
sterling area 
 
3.1 Management of the sterling balances 
Britain emerged from WWII owing tremendous sums to parts of the British Empire. These              
accrued because members of the sterling area pooled any dollar-surpluses made from trade             
with the dollar area in gold reserves held in London. During WWII, Britain requested that the                
gold reserves, which were usually kept within individual nations, and against which they          
backed their own currencies, be transferred to London to allow the British government to            
make strategic use of the gold during the war years. These war debts were known as sterling                 
balances, and many nations within the sterling area held such an account with Britain. The               
sterling balances functioned as a kind of credit account, whereby, rather than Britain paying              
for a commodity, such as manpower or resources, in gold, the sterling balance would be               
increased, to be redeemed following the end of the war. The British Prime Minister of the                
time, Winston Churchill, assured consenting nations that this would be to their own benefit              
by bolstering Britain’s efforts to contest the expansion of Germany and Japan; the fight              
against fascism (Hinds 2001: 89). The promise was that following the end of the war, the                
gold would be returned, as well as the credit stored in the sterling balances. Sterling               
balance returns were to be spent specifically on colonial development. This would be a              
reward to the people of those nations for their contribution to the war effort (Saville 1993:                
196). 
The sterling balances were managed differently according to particular nations and         
their political relationship with Britain, however, certain patterns do emerge. The wartime            
coalition government introduced controls such as the ‘1943 rules’, which tightened           
regulation of colonial monetary matters (Narsey 2016: 173) Any new currency brought into             
circulation in the colonies would have to be backed with 110% of its value in London               
(Schenk 2018: 7). Profits in foreign denominations gained from trade would no longer be             
repatriated to the exporting nation but also be pooled in London, held predominantly in              
government bonds paying low interest. The exchange controls discouraged sterling area           
nations from investing their colonial reserves on non-sterling assets, to minimise any            
negative impact on the balance of payments. While independent Commonwealth nations           
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 like Australia were free to diversify their holdings of foreign currencies beyond sterling, the              
dependent colonies were barred from diversifying beyond sterling (Narsey 2016: 195). 
The sterling balances stood after the war and these debts posed a threat to the British                
post-war recovery because if these debts were immediately recalled, and the balances were             
spent on goods from outside the sterling area, it could have had a disastrous effect on the                
sterling area’s – and therefore Britain’s – balance of payments with the USA during the time                
of the dollar shortage. As such, the sterling balances were a matter of some anxiety in               
Britain and the governments’ priority became to minimise the impact of the debts on the               
balance of payments, and to postpone – and if at all possible, to cancel entirely -  the               
repayment of Britain’s war debts to the colonies (Narsey 2016: 171).   
The restrictions imposed on the spending power of the sterling area members by these              
strict wartime sterling balance controls went against the USA’s plans for a liberal world              
order, and in 1945, the Attlee government committed to removing these controls by July              
1947 as part of their post-war loan negotiations (Tomlinson 1997: 26). When restrictions on              
capital movements and currency exchange were lifted in 1947, investors whose money had            
been locked up in sterling began to invest in the dollar area, resulting in a run on the pound.                   
Concerned that there would be imminent economic collapse, the government promptly          
reinstated controls. From this point on, the management of the sterling area – how to retain                
a favourable balance of trade with the dollar area; the question of how to dispose of the                 
accumulated sterling balances – became of prime importance.  
The sterling balances provided a source of cheap finance for the government, obtained             
at far more favourable rates than was possible on the private market or had been              
negotiated with the USA. A significant portion of the balances were kept in the form of               
short-term government securities, paying little interest to the holder (Narsey 2016: 165).           
While useful for the government, these securities were unpopular on the private market             
and a liability for the Bank of England to hold. Noting that the government considered, and                
subsequently discounted, floating gilt-edged securities on the private       
market with the conditions accepted by the colonies, Narsey argues that “what the      
authorities could not achieve with private British investors was freely imposed on the Crown              
Agents who were managing colonial funds.” (Narsey 2016: 165). Furthermore, the fact that          
the government controlled monetary policy in the sterling area gave them even more             
control over the sterling balances, and the ability to manage them. When the government             
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 devalued the pound in 1947, this effectively lowered the value of the sterling balances              
against the dollar, thereby in real terms lowering the value of Britain’s debts to              
balance-holders (Schenk 2018: 7; Narsey 2016: 250). 
 
3.2 Colonial development and export drives 
 The Attlee governments, in particular their Fabian wing, had long considered           
development policy for the colonies, but these designs became most consequential in 1948             
following the aborted attempt to lift exchange controls governing the sterling area            
(Hinds 2001)  . The idea was to mobilise resources in the colonies which had the potential to               2
be “dollar-saving” or “dollar-earning” commodities. Dollar savers provided the sterling area          
with an alternative source for goods such as cocoa, crude oil, cooking oils and primary               
materials that were demanded by consumers and industry without needing to trade with             
the USA. Dollar-earners were commodities in demand in the dollar area, whose sale to the               
USA made a positive contribution to the sterling area’s balance of payments with the USA.               
The idea of this development drive was that there were untapped reservoirs of resources            
lying dormant in the British Empire that had the potential to transform the sterling area into                
an economically self-sufficient unit capable of competing with the USA. All that was needed              
to unlock this potential was investment and the guidance of British experts (Gupta 2002c).  
In 1948 the government founded the Colonial Primary Products Committee (CPPC). The           
CPPC identified which goods were in demand in Britain and the USA, and determined              
locations within the sterling area where the production of dollar-earners and dollar-savers            
could be increased (Hinds 2001: 96). At this point, “mobilization of [colonial] resources             
became a significant aspect of economic recovery” (Hinds 2001: 121). The British            
government would provide finance and technical expertise to support the development of            
these productive capacities. In colonial Africa, British-led marketing boards determined the           
prices of commodities and determined where they were to be distributed to. The planned              
mobilization of these resources was a step towards making efficient use of scarce             
resources. The most significant development schemes were launched in Malaya – to           
increase output of rubber and tin – and in the West African colonies, where agricultural             
development could provide foodstuffs to the sterling area. Also significant was Iran, a British              
2 See Hinds (2001) for a comprehensive account of the Attlee governments’ development policy 
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 protectorate whose oil fields provided a valuable alternative to American oil (Saville 1993:             
147).  
Hinds cites 1948 as a turning point in the British governments’ mentality with regards              
to colonial development, a point at which the need to positively affect the balance of              
payments began to outweigh the local needs of the colonies in terms of importance (Hinds               
2001: 106). Plans for generalised welfare and development aid were postponed until a more              
suitable time. During their last four years in power, the primary criterion against which the               
Labour governments judged whether a development project would be granted finance was            
the proof that it would be economically viable and quickly produce significant returns             
(Narsey 2016: 193; Hinds 2001: 196). The government understood – or at least presented –              
a thriving British economy to be a necessary precursor to social welfare in the dependent               
colonies. Thus, while the independent Commonwealth nations attracted the lion’s share of           
private finance, government finance tended to be awarded only in areas where the            
potential for rich returns could be demonstrated on paper. In practice, this meant that              
government-led development was most active in Malaya, and the West African colonies of             
Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Hinds 2001: 39). 
 
3.3 Outsourcing austerity 
Austerity was an integral aspect of the Labour governments’ management of the sterling            
area’s economy in the immediate post-war years for Britain and the sterling area territories.              
There were two aspects to the austerity measures: suppression of aggregate demand and             
cuts to government investment. The Attlee governments viewed suppressing aggregate          
demand as a vital means of managing the economy during the dollar shortage, as reducing               
net imports from the dollar area would slow down the balance of payments deficit with the                
USA. As with the other primary controls, the controls over imports were inherited from the               
wartime years.  
Prior to 1948, the Attlee government tightly controlled the distribution of resources in             
Britain, and while the controls on rationing continued until 1952, they relinquished much of              
this control to market forces following the “bonfire of controls” in 1948. However, the              
government continued to closely monitor the imports of the dependent colonies while          
provisions of necessities were granted on an ad hoc basis (Krozewski 2001: 62). The              
government devised quotas for imports from the dollar area for each individual sterling area              
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 territory, with Britain and the independent commonwealth nations consistently given higher           
quotas for American imports and greater access to public development funds; controls were             
“more stringent in the colonies than in the UK” (Krozewski 2001: 62). This is despite the fact                
that the colonies tended to run trade surpluses with the USA while the sterling area’s deficit               
originated with the independent nations. In fact, demand management of the sterling area             
consistently favoured territories with greater concentrations of white European settlers.          
Malaya and the African colonies were net earners for the sterling area yet were allocated               
less in the import quotas than majority white territories such as Australia. Notably, Kenya              
was given a greater allowance than other African nations on account of its higher              
populations of white settlers. The government stated the need to ensure that the settlers’              
standard of living was comparable to those on the British Isles (Krozewski 2001). Australia              
and New Zealand were also allowed access to finance from private lenders on the London               
market, whereas other territories were barred in order to stem imports from the dollar              
area. Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand were the primary destination for British            
capital in these years (Narsey 2016: 195), despite the greater risk their economies posed to               
the stability of the pound.  
Austerity also took the form of cuts to public funds in the colonies. In the literature                
surrounding the Attlee years, “austerity” is generally used only to describe the suppression             
of aggregate demand. The word does not carry the connotations of cuts to             
government expenditure, a meaning which has become particularly prominent in the wake           
of the 2008 financial crisis. That the Attlee governments expanded spending on social           
welfare in Britain during their time in office might suggest that post-war austerity was of a                
different nature. However, the contemporary understanding of “austerity” aptly describes          
the post-war period for much of the Empire. The development grants and investment             
promised but not delivered by the Attlee governments were essentially cuts to welfare             
expenditure, as the 1938 Colonial Act outlined the British governments’ responsibility to            
provide for social welfare in these countries (Hinds 2001: 24) . The government justified             3
these cuts by reference to the scarcity of government finance at the time.   
 
  
3 See Hinds (2001) pp.130-147 for a detailed account of the Attlee governments’ cuts to colonial development 
finance. 
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 Chapter 4: The effects of sterling area policy on Britain 
 
The Attlee governments’ arrangements for the sterling balances were undoubtedly         
advantageous to Britain’s interests. Krozewski emphasises the significance of these loans in           
the public purse. Without these loans the Attlee governments may well have been forced to               
reduce expenditure – and thereby threaten their expensive plans for social reform – or              
make further political concessions to the USA in order to access further American loans. It               
also permitted the government to pursue a cheap money policy domestically, without            
provoking inflation (Krokewski 2001: 75). The governments’ celebrated macroeconomic         
policy could not have taken the form it took without these loans. 
The loans also benefited the wider British economy. Krozewski describes capital exports          
as the “sine qua non of British economic policy”, and financial services remained at the            
heart of the British economy despite the limitation of exchange with the dollar area (Narsey               
2016: 192; Krozewski 2001: 9-10). British banks operating overseas continued to invest            
heavily in the Americas, in spite of regulation (Narsey 2016: 250); and while investment             
shifted notably towards independent nations in the sterling area, such as Australia, these             
nations were notoriously “leaky”, continuing to spend significant sums in the dollar area.             
Tomlinson notes that British banks operating overseas continued to bring about a flow of              
capital outside of the sterling area. That much of the sterling balances were held in liquid                
form allowed British financiers to continue this business; Narsey describe the portion of the           
sterling balances held in reserve as “insurance policies against monetary crises caused by           
the continuous export of British capital and the declining competitiveness of British           
industry” (Narsey 2016: 194). The sterling reserves ensured that the export of capital would              
not cause the value of the pound to decline. As well as bolstering the price of stocks, a                  
strong pound incentivised the use of the currency for trade, allowing British financiers to              
continue to profit from invisible earnings on international trade. British banks relied on             
exporting capital in order to earn a profit, and yet the export of capital itself reduced the                 
reserves on the pound.  
The sterling balances became in effect a capital investment in the British economy            
(Narsey 2016: 178), benefiting Britain’s class of financiers as well as the government, and              
thereby the beneficiaries of welfare spending, the working class. British industry was            
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 increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage, and historians argue that a greater upheaval             
in industrial planning would be needed to make it competitive again (Saville 1993). A              
successful financial services industry made up some of the ground that Britain was losing in               
terms of exports. At a time of relative economic precarity, when the upper classes of Britain                
had also been forced to compromise and permit controls on capital and increased taxation,              
the government was unwilling to enter into confrontation with the City. Tomlinson notes           
that this allowed the government to “avoid questions about the role of Britain as a capital                
exporter and how healthy that is for the UK” (Tomlinson 1997: 66). While capital controls               
obstructed traditional avenues of investment to the USA, British banks developed new            
markets, and British capital exports continued to comprise a significant proportion of            
Britain’s GDP (Jones 1993: 247).  
 The development drive was also beneficial to Britain’s economy and enabled the Attlee             
governments to pursue their domestic programme for social democracy. The development          
drive assured the steady supply of primary resources to the British economy. During the              
Attlee years, the geographical spread of the resources underpinning the British economy            
originated in British territories to a greater degree than since before the industrial             
revolution. The production of raw materials like tin, rubber and timber secured capital             
inputs for British industries without impacting the balance of payments with the USA. Paying             
less to access capital input also allowed British companies to derive larger profits from their               
industry and to maintain workers’ wages. The Attlee governments also benefited as their             
social democratic programme was materially underpinned by significant amounts of primary           
materials used to build housing, hospitals, weaponry and roads (Tomlinson 1997: 237-251).            
While the working class stood to benefit from these higher wages and social reforms, British               
consumers more widely benefited from enjoying privileged access to scarce consumer           
goods; and from having colonial production geared towards satisfying the demand of British             
households (Fieldhouse 1984: 20).  
 However, perhaps more significant than the flow of commodities within the sterling            
area was the increase in exports to the dollar area. Exports to the USA from the colonies                 
affected the sterling area’s balance of payments in the same way as if the commodities had                
been produced in the British Isles. The most important implication for this is that it               
supported the value of the pound sterling. Though not advantageous to Britain’s            
export-oriented industries, it was in the interests of the City of London’s financiers to retain               
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 the value of the pound, preventing a run on the pound as had happened in 1947 (Saville                 
1993: 172). The profits of colonial labour acted as a counterweight to the inflationary              
activities of the British financiers.  
Furthermore, by encouraging the colonies to specialise in the production of demanded            
primary commodities, the Attlee governments created space for British industry to pursue            
productive, high value new industries using technology developed during the war. Indeed, in             
the post-war years, the British production of chemicals boomed (Jones 1993: 247). Higher            
technology industries ensured that more wealth would be created in Britain, and the British              
workforce benefited from accessing higher-skilled work. ​As such, colonial labour aided the            
British economic recovery and the development of industry in the post-war years.  
The Labour governments’ blueprints for colonial development were also informed by          
the will to preserve British political power and influence on a global scale. The governments               
saw a geostrategic role in supporting the development of the British Empire and considered              
it to be a vital step in making the sterling area economically competitive with the USA and                 
thereby a vital means of securing Britain’s role as a world power (Tomlinson 1997: 62). 
For Britain, outsourcing austerity to the Empire’s dependent colonies had significant           
benefits for the government and population alike. The role that outscoring austerity played             
in the navigation of the economic crises that befell the sterling area allowed the British               
government to avoid harsher austerity measures domestically, allowing the expansion of           
the welfare state. As with the export drive, the outsourcing of austerity and limits on               
expenditure in the dollar area helped maintain stability in a time when the balance of               
payments threatened further economic crises for the sterling area. This maintenance of the             
value of the pound ensured British wages remained stable, allowing the population of Great              
Britain privileged access to scarce consumer goods, despite the fact that Britain continued             
to run a trade deficit with the USA throughout this period.  
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 Chapter 5: The effects of sterling area policy on the British Empire 
 
In contrast, the sterling arrangements were of little benefit to the British Empire’s             
dependent colonies. In the short run, the sterling balance arrangements deprived          
dependent colonies of one of the primary benefits to be gained from membership of the               
sterling area, the interest that would supposedly accrue on the colonies reserves in London              
(Narsey 2016: 195). The exchange of bonds for real money was not a one-to-one             
exchange, there being more uncertainty about bonds retaining their value than          
gold. Indeed, the amount that balance-holders gained from interest payments over these           
years was dwarfed by the level of value that was lost when the pound was devalued in 1949                  
(Abreu 2015; Narsey 2016). There were significant capital losses for colonies forced to hold              
sterling reserves, though this was less problematic for independent dominions which had            
already begun to diversify their currency reserves beyond sterling. Abreu emphasises the           
effect this had on India in particular, the value of whose sterling assets decreased by around               
30% (Abreu 2015: 26).  
Furthermore, Labour’s policy on sterling deprived the colonies of another benefit of            
sterling area membership, national economic development stemming from value captured          
from the increased global trade permitted by sterling area membership. As long as the            
surplus value from international trade was held in London, this capital was inaccessible to              
colonial governments, and while the British government had promised that the funds would           
become accessible for the purpose of national development, in reality few loans were            
granted. The British governments’ cuts in development finance to the colonies will be            
covered in further detail in the next section.  
 The consequences of the British-led development projects varied across different parts           
of the Empire. In Malaya, Sutton demonstrates that development projects had a broadly             
positive impact on economic development in the long run (Sutton 2015). However, parts of              
the Empire which showed little promise in mobilising dollar-earners and dollar-savers, such            
as the British Caribbean, attracted little capital investment, and for these parts of the              
Empire, the most notable aspect of British development policy was the failure of the Attlee               
governments to deliver development grants proposed during the war (Hinds 2001). In other             
parts of the Empire, such as colonial West Africa, British-led development schemes were             
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 nothing short of a disaster (Hinds 2001; Krozewski 2001). While African labour was           
mobilised in large agricultural schemes, this did not translate into increased           
productivity. Utietiang Ukelina attributes inadequate funds, poor planning with lack of local          
input, and the implementation of inappropriate modernisation techniques as reasons for           
failure (Utietiang Ukelina 2017a). Here, the impact of utilising internal resources according            
to the demand of the British and American markets rather than local needs was more keenly                
felt.  
The dependent colonies all had in common, however, that by pooling currency reserves            
and dollar surpluses in London, increases in productivity and trade with the USA was              
prevented from immediately translating to economic growth, increased savings and          
investment or higher wages (Narsey 2016). Malaya and the West African colonies did not              
immediately benefit from the increase in exports, having already been running a balance of              
payments surplus with the USA. Whereas Britain benefited from being able to continually             
run a balance of payments deficit with the USA without mortally wounding its own currency               
and economy, there was no corresponding benefit for the dependent colonies. The           
independent Commonwealth nations were also consistently in deficit with the USA so this       
was also beneficial to them.  
 In the long term, the export drive has been cited as a cause of underdevelopment in                
the colonies. While Sutton gives compelling evidence to suggest that the British-led           
development process had a positive impact on Malayan development, or at least           
transforming it into a “nation with a suitable economy for modern capitalism” (Sutton             
2015), Narsey and Utietiang Ukelina suggest that the British-led development plans’ failures,       
and the agrarian bias they encouraged, had consequences lasting far beyond the period            
(Narsey 2016; Utietiang Ukelina 2017b). Elsewhere in the British Empire, the governments’           
failure to provide development funding in this period, because it could not be proved that              
projects would be economically viable, obstructed economic development. This leads Hinds          
to conclude that “making Britain responsible for social and political advancement of the             
colonies was not mutually beneficial” (Hinds 2001: 196). While the long-term effects of           
this are open to debate, on the short term this was problematic for the colonies,             
especially in light of the British governments presenting economic development as a          
necessary precursor to political independence.  
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 Development projects also played a political role in preserving power in the colonies.             
The British government consulted with ethnically Malayan smallholders on the development           
of rubber plantations in order to earn their favour and thereby discourage them from              
joining the Maoist insurgency that was sweeping rural Malaya, predominantly led by            
ethnically Chinese Malayans (Sutton 2015). The fear of rising nationalist sentiment also            
informed development in the Empire more widely. Utietiang Ukelina (2017b) describes how           
development officers from the British government tended to avoid projects geared towards            
the development of industrial capacities due to concern that industrialisation would be            
socially and politically disruptive to British rule.  
The outsourcing of austerity to the colonies had an immediate and tangible effect on              
colonial living standards. Demand management was successful in reducing dollar imports in            
the dependent colonies according to government targets . Shortages of consumer goods           4
were reported across the Empire (Hinds 2001: 199). With sterling area territories’            
productive capacities geared towards export to the dollar area market, production from            
within the sterling area did not meet the needs of the dependent colonies. Colonies were               
sometimes able to source goods through regional trade with other non-sterling territories,            
and thereby evade the controls on dollar imports (Sutton 2015), however the controls             
resulted in shortages and a squeeze on living standards (Tomlinson 1997: 65; Hinds 2001:              
198). Established supply chains had been ruptured across the British Empire during WWII,             
much as in Europe, and the British-imposed restrictions made it even more difficult to              
ensure supply (Hinds 2001: 198). There are few exact statistics for shortages outside of the               
independent Commonwealth since the British government abandoned surveys proposed to          
ascertain what consumer goods were most needed in the colonies due to expense (Narsey              
2016). However, shortages were a common point of reference for nationalist movements            
against British rule throughout this period (Hinds 2001; Krozewski 2001). Furthermore, the            
shortage of consumer goods on colonial markets effectively devalued the wages of colonial             
workers, capable of purchasing fewer consumer goods than at previous points in time.  
The orthodox interpretation of the Attlee governments’ legacy includes the idea that            
they transformed capitalism in a way that protects workers from market forces by ensuring              
that basic needs can always be met by the welfare state. However, whereas the government               
4 See Krozewski (2001), pp.101-104 for comparative estimates for dollar expenditure across the sterling area 
during the Attlee years, and an explanation of the barriers towards ascertaining exact figures. 
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 had ensured that British workers were insulated from economic crises through the welfare             
state, colonial welfare remained dependent on the strength of the colonial economy. As            
long as there was a demand for colonial commodities, there would be employment. But in              
the event of economic crisis, workers would be exposed to the negative impact of market              
forces experienced in the Western world throughout the 1930s: job losses, structural            
unemployment and poverty. Labour’s policy of outsourcing austerity expanded the         
protection from market forces to include the working class of Britain, but these risks              
remained – and in fact increased – for workers in the colonies.  
At state level, and in the long run, austerity in the colonies obstructed economic              
development (Krozewski 2001: 91). The restrictions on imports limited the dependent           
colonies’ access to capital inputs for industry, necessary for industrial development. This            
was felt particularly acutely in territories of the sterling area that did not receive direct               
finance from the British government as their productive capacities did not match the             
demands of the American market (Krozewski 2001).  
The cuts in development funding created the conditions for a capital drain from the              
dependent colonies to Britain and the independent nations of the Commonwealth. Between           
1946 and 1955, sterling balances – tantamount to investment in the British economy - were               
£1200m, which dwarfs the £450m investment received by the colonies (Narsey 2016: 193).             
Narsey argues that this loss of capital resulted in the underdevelopment of the Empire’s             
dependent colonies, noting that the cuts in development finance were never made up for in               
the future. This leads Tomlinson to conclude that Britain failed to “deliver the goods”             
(Tomlinson 1997: 64). Further research is needed to elucidate the longer term            
consequences for colonial populations who lived through this time of deprivation. 
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 Chapter 6: Judgement of the Attlee governments’ agency in these          
effects 
 
Orthodox accounts of the Attlee years often describe the monetary policy over the sterling              
area as being pragmatic, technical and apolitical. However, the Attlee governments’ sterling            
area policies were deeply political in that they fulfilled domestic political goals, were             
influenced by political ideologies, were implemented by political means and had political            
effects on the global economic landscape. Historians continue to debate whether the Attlee             
government could and should have pursued alternative policies. Unfortunately, it is beyond            
the scope of this essay to give a thorough evaluation of each of the alternatives proposed.                
However, it is vital to determine whether this governments’ failings stemmed from their             
political decisions or systemic constraints; not only to improve our understanding of this            
particular period in history, but to better understand how social justice on a global level can                
be pursued.  
 
6.1 Sterling area policies were a result of political negotiations and decisions  
A common objection to imperial historians’ criticisms of government colonial policy is that             
the governments had limited access to information and therefore cannot be blamed for the              
negative effects of their monetary policies, if they were unaware of them. In particular, the              
political implications of monetary policy only became a prominent topic of academic debate             
in the 1960s and 1970s with the advent of monetarism. However, for the aspects of sterling                
area management described in this thesis, there is evidence to suggest that these policies              
were contested both within the government and by the colonial nations, and were the              
result of political debate and negotiations (Narsey 2016: 173).  
Historians have maintained that the Attlee governments should not be held responsible           
for the sterling balance arrangements’ detrimental effect on the colonies, emphasising that            
the governments inherited these controls and had little choice but to pursue the courses of               
action they did, lest they sacrifice the interests of British and colonial peoples alike by               
permitting monetary instability (Schenk 2015: 11; Sutton 2015). However, Abreu (2015)           
emphasises that the arrangement for India’s sterling balance liquidation following          
independence was the result of lengthy negotiations with the British government. Drawing            
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 from a variety of sources such as cabinet memos, speeches, and responses to academic              
criticisms, Narsey argues that the government were aware of the potentially negative          
effects of their sterling area policy. Furthermore, he provides evidence of the different         
methods that the government considered using to avoid their obligation to pay back the            
sterling loans, including the outright cancellation of the sterling balances. This was John             
Maynard Keynes’ favoured course of action, who, in a memorandum destined for the war              
cabinet in 1945 argued that sterling balances should be cancelled “as a contribution to              
Britain’s war effort” (Narsey 2016: 172). However, his advice was not acted upon as this              
would have been too large a provocation to the colonies. 
There was also dissent to the Attlee governments’ development and export drive            
policies. Colonial governments complained that promised development grants had not          
materialised and that it was unfair to only launch development projects that            
would be beneficial to the sterling area’s balance of payments crisis, as opposed to social             
need. The latter was a point of contention within the Attlee governments also, with              
members of the Colonial Office expressing concern that colonial development had begun to            
take on an exploitative form. Rita Hinden was a leading voice in the Labour Party advocating              
for Britain to take on a more developmental role in the Empire. She expressed her concern                
that the government were sacrificing the wellbeing of colonial peoples in their efforts to              
protect the British working class: “it was a British electorate which had given Labour a               
majority and for them colonial reforms were less important that the welfare state, social              
security, stable prices and full employment” (Gupta 2002a: 259). 
Furthermore, nationalist movements across the Empire drew attention to the Attlee           
governments of the colonial peoples opposition to these monetary policies. Hinds           
and Krozewski note how the sterling balances arrangements were a focal point for          
nationalist movements throughout the Empire during the post-war years, especially in the            
Gold Coast and Ceylon (Hinds 2001; Krozewski 2001). Resentment to British-imposed          
austerity measures and the subsequent rise in the price of essential commodities famously             
found expression in the riots that broke out in Accra, Gold Coast in 1948, which the British                 
took seriously as a threat to their rule in the area. Despite these protestations, the policies                
were maintained, suggesting the Attlee governments considered these effects to be a            
necessary cost to their economic policy. This makes the defence of the Attlee governments              
as having been naïve and ignorant of the effects of their decisions harder to swallow. 
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6.2 The colonies had little influence over the terms of policy 
The governments’ abilities to manage sterling area policy according to British needs was             
largely possible thanks to the political power that the government had over the Empire,              
particularly the dependent colonies. A comparison with the Attlee governments’          
negotiations for US finance illustrates how political power affected the outcomes of            
negotiations over the sterling balances. US loans were secured over a series of negotiations,              
where each party brought their own political interests to the table. While Britain wanted to             
secure as much finance as possible, on the best conditions as possible, the USA wanted to                
secure a liberal, multilateral, future for the global economy. In 1945 the USA agreed a loan                
with Britain on the political conditions that Britain would begin to liberalise the controls              
securing the sterling area and that Britain would commit itself as an ally in the emerging                
Cold War (Tomlinson 1997: 26). As was also the case with Marshall Aid, conditions on the                
loans such as their length, interest rate and the understanding that Britain would embrace              
American-made commodities ensured that the loans would also be compatible with the           
USA’s political and economic interests in the emerging post-war world. In comparison to             
these loans, the colonies were able to exert little influence on the decisions determining              
how the sterling balances would be managed. The conditions on the sterling balances were              
comparatively in the interests of Britain, and the colonies were able to get few concrete               
assurances that would guarantee that the situation would be of mutual benefit.   
As an imperial power, Britain, and therefore the Attlee governments, was able to             
enforce unfavourable policies in the colonies, and were willing to back them up by forceful               
measures. While historians emphasise the dependent colonies’ agency in implementing the           
British government’s plans for the sterling balances, noting that policies were finally enacted             
by agents within the colonies (Darwin 2012; Sutton 2015), Krozewski cites a government            
memorandum stating that the Attlee governments were confident that the political           
structure of the sterling area would ensure that colonies would comply. If not, “more formal             
measures of control could be introduced if required” (Krozewski 2001: 75).   
The government also deceived colonial governments at Commonwealth meetings        
about the nature and justification of their monetary policies, specifically regarding sterling            
balances. Narsey argues that the British government “interfered with the legitimate process            
of the crown agents and colonial governments” (Narsey 2016: 195). Sutton describes how            
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 British governments in the 1950s depoliticised sterling area policy by presenting the            
arrangements as a technical necessity, in order to remove policies from contestation in the              
political arena (Sutton 2015). Depoliticisation is a useful way of conceptualising the British             
governments’ negotiating tactics during the Attlee years. 
 
6.3 The Attlee governments prioritised the British electorate 
In a practical sense, the Labour government depended on the British electorate to keep              
them in power. Thus, this bound them to a course that would protect the interests of the                 
British public, even if it came at the expense of welfare in the colonies, in order to maintain                  
their political position. Sterling area policies detrimental to the colonies also came at a lower               
political cost than cutting military expenditure and reneging on commitments made to the             
USA to provide support in the emerging Cold War. Krozewski notes that “while economic            
austerity in Britain increased political risk to the government, austerity remained feasible in             
the colonies” (Krozewski 2001: 62).  
The government had a legal obligation to secure the welfare of colonial populations as              
much as British residents, however, the assumption is prevalent amongst orthodox           
historians of the period that the Labour governments were, or at least understood             
themselves to be, responsible to the population of ​Great Britain ​before all. The historical            
record is clear that the government prioritised the needs of British people and the British               
economy if they came into conflict with those of colonial peoples and colonial economies              
(Hinds 2001). Elected in a landslide victory on a social democratic ticket, the Labour              
government had promised to improve living standards for the British working class,            
especially given the traumas of fighting in WWII. Field (1992) suggests that the Labour party               
mobilised language and imagery of the British nation as a community of people to a greater                
extent than earlier governments, in order to explain and popularise their policies to the              
British electorate.  
 
6.4 Ideological influences on policy decisions 
The Attlee governments relied on the advice of the British Civil Service on matters of sterling                
area management. Little had been written in the social democratic rulebook, and the             
ascendant left-wing economic theory was far more concerned with fiscal rather than            
monetary policy. Hinds and Krozewski  detail the ideological outlook of the Civil Service at            
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 the time. They note that there was a significant degree of continuity in Whitehall’s              
personnel between the Labour governments and the preceding governments which were           
predominantly Conservative (Hinds 2001; Krozewski 2001). They argue that, relying on the            
Civil Service for advice on matters in which they were inexperienced, the Labour             
governments’ pragmatism was ​de facto ​conservative. For this reason, Saville argues that         
Labour’s management of the international economy was largely continuous with previous           
conservative governments (Saville 1993).  
Shilliam illustrates the extent to which eugenicist beliefs about the inherent superiority         
of White British were prevalent in the British establishment, including Attlee’s Labour party,             
and how these beliefs informed government policy. The idea that White British Working            
Class were born with a genetic tendency towards morality and “co-operation” rendered           
them worthy of social protection, so that “labour’s co-operative spirit” would remain in the              
British gene pool (Shilliam 2018). In contrast, non-white peoples were understood as            
genetically inferior and therefore undeserving of the same rights and standard of living as              
White British people, even if this was not explicitly stated in law. The British government               
saw the colonies as ‘unready’ for a comparable standard of living to White British People.               
This was particularly noticeable in the demand management of the sterling area, with             
territories comprising greater concentrations of white European settlers consistently         
favoured.  
These beliefs about a hierarchy of races had an additional effect on policy-making.             
Fabianism had long flirted with the idea that, as a superior race, British people had the                
moral duty to guide colonial development (Shilliam 2018: 66-73; Gupta 2002c). The idea was            
prevalent in the Labour party that the colonies would not be ready for political              
independence until they had developed advanced economies under British guidance. Gupta           
describes the Labour Party’s Fabian wing as “obsessed with the salvation of the African”              
(Gupta 2002c). While Europeans (the British in particular) were taken to be at the top of the                
racial hierarchy, sub-Saharan Africans were taken to be the most inferior of races, with              
South Asian peoples being somewhere in the middle (Gupta 2002c). In the Fabian mindset,             
international development was closely linked with ideals for the future of the Empire and              
the success of social democracy on a global scale. 
This notion of there being a hierarchy of peoples clearly informed the British             
governments’ plan for the economy. Utietiang Ukelina (2017a) notes that development           
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 projects in Nigeria were exclusively British-led, with local people being barred from roles as              
development officers and giving little input into the blueprints for development. He further             
cites an “agrarian bias” in British thought, the assumption that Africans were unready for             
the development of advanced industries, and that Africans were inherently better suited to             
the (lower value) sectors of agriculture and extraction (Utietiang Ukelina 2017b). Sutton            
portrays a different state of affairs in Malaya, where the Malayan government and Malayan              
workers were more closely engaged in development plans (Sutton 2015). Shilliam and          
Gupta’s insights into the Labour governments’ assumptions about the capacities of Asian           
peoples have been used to explain Britain’s apparent willingness to devolve political            
independence to its South Asian colonies before the African colonies. Perhaps it provides             
some insight into the differences between West African and Malayan experiences of the             
post-war export drive.  
 
6.5 Sterling area policies had global political ramifications 
Economic policy was also political in the sense that it significantly shaped the outcomes of               
the global economic system, particularly within the sterling area, where certain groups            
benefited at the expense of others. Fieldhouse argues that if anything, “Britain exploited in             
more ways and with more serious consequences than at any time” (Fieldhouse 1984:             
99). That British economic policy shaped economic activity throughout the Empire meant          
that ideological biases in Westminster produced real-world effects, entrenching        
international inequalities and shaping the lived experience of colonial workers throughout         
the Empire. The Attlee governments also used its depoliticised monetary policy to maintain             
political power over its colonies at a time when independence movements were threatening             
British rule, such as the case in Malaya where development drives were part of the British                
defence strategy against Maoist insurgencies.  
The Attlee governments’ policies may well have contributed to colonial          
underdevelopment, especially in West Africa (Narsey 2016; Abreu 2015). While there is            
consensus in the literature on British policy’s short-term impact on the dependent colonies,           
its long run significance for colonial development has been doubted (Sutton 2015). Sutton             
warns against treating the British Empire as a monolithic entity and drawing conclusions             
that claim to be applicable to the totality of Britain’s relationships with its colonies (Sutton               
2015). Citing Malaya’s positive experience of British-led development, he argues that even            
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 in situations where Britain held imperial political control over the territory and its economic              
development, and they acted in British interests, the economic relationships could still            
prove to be mutually beneficial in the short and long run. Furthermore, Darwin warns            
against the tendency of historians of imperialism to exaggerate the power that Britain really              
had over the Empire (Darwin 2012). Applied to this case, this might imply that the failure of                 
British-led development projects is not sufficient proof that the government caused           
underdevelopment; and that, regardless of their motivations and the poor outcomes of the             
development projects, British-led development only had a limited effect on colonial           
economies and day-to-day life. However, Hinds (2001) demonstrates that British         
development policy in fact played a significant role in determining economic conditions in             
the colonies. He suggests that development in the colonies took on an emerging, new form               
as a result of the Attlee governments’ policies (Hinds 2001). A comparative account of              
sterling policy’s long run effects on different parts of the world will be necessary to more                
accurately determine an answer to this. In any case, placing this period of global history into                
a longer-term context reveals significant continuity in Britain’s relations with its colonies;            
that the Labour governments pursued social democracy domestically did little to change the             
Empire’s international distribution of winners and losers.  
 
6.6 Alternative courses of action  
There are of course limits to truly knowing whether or not alternative courses of actions             
were possible, or what the outcome of such counterfactuals would have been. Historians             
cite the fact that the global political economy had moved into uncharted territory, blinkering              
the government’s ability to foresee the consequences of their policies or any alternatives             
(Heinlein 2002: 184). However, several suggestions have been proffered for how Attlee’s            
governments could have had a more socially-just impact on a global level; or at least, could                
have implemented a nationally focused social democratic programme without having a         
negative effect on living standards in the dependent colonies.  
Perhaps the most prominent suggestion in the literature concerns the level of            
investment the government devoted to maintaining a military presence across the world            
and in expanding their military presence in East Asia. Britain committed a much higher              
proportion of its national budget to defence than any other European nation during this              
period. Had levels of spending been lower, the sterling crises may have been less acutely               
33 
 
 felt, which may have taken some of the deflationary pressure off the dependent colonies.              
While there were clearly countervailing circumstances to this course of action, particularly            
Britain’s economic dependence on loans from the USA, which created an incentive to tailor              
foreign policy to American tastes, it is difficult to maintain that this was an ​impossible ​course             
of action. Saville (1993) details how foreign policy was bitterly contested even within the             
Labour cabinet, and there is no shortage of evidence of detractors at the time. 
 In terms of alternative economic policies that could have avoided the imperialist            
exploitation of the colonies, Tomlinson argues that Britain could have restructured its            
economy in such a way as to avoid a reliance on its financial services sector, thereby                
liberating some of the constraints on international economic policy (Tomlinson 1997:67).           
The role of the financial sector in Britain’s economy continues to be a perennial topic of                
debate for historians. Furthermore, Saville (1993) argues that contra the governments’           
reputation for radicalism, the interests of Britain’s upper classes were not really threatened             
during Attlee’s time in office. A more radical programme of redistribution at home could              
have avoided the need to source investment from abroad.  
The Attlee governments could also have disbanded the sterling area’s monetary union,            
the mechanism by which exploitation surfaced (Saville 1993) There is a strong case for              
accepting that the governments’ policy on matters of sterling and foreign policy was             
motivated by an ideological attachment to British grandiosity on the world stage as much as             
by actual circumstance. This would suggest that the limiting factor to taking alternative            
courses of action was the governments’ own mindset as opposed to real            
possibilities. Alternatively, had the dependent colonies had more autonomy over currency,          
and the ability to diversify beyond holding sterling, they may also have been able to benefit                
more from membership of the sterling area.  
Democratisation could also have acted as a possible counterbalance to imperial           
exploitation. The implication of Krozewski’s argument that Britain pursued a policy of            
austerity in the colonies because the structure of the British polity made this politically              
expedient is that if the dependent colonies had been granted independence earlier, or at              
the very least were enfranchised, the government may have had no choice but to act with                
the interests of ​all ​British citizens in mind. It should be recalled that Labour’s social             
democratic programme and interventionist management of the economy was radical at this           
point in time. The idea that a government could manage the economy in such a way as to                 
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 ensure that the working class was protected ran counter to ​laissez-faire ​ideals of           
non-intervention which were ascendant through much of British history. Even in a time of             
crisis, where pragmatism was the order of the day, the enfranchisement of the British              
Working Class and their representation in government ensured that any course of action             
threatening their interests would be deemed unpragmatic. In this way, the working class’s             
input into a democratised political process ensured their future wellbeing. Had economic            
pragmatism been understood as discounting any course of action threatening the wellbeing            
of working people the world over, this could have forced the government to innovate a               
different solution. In this way, Labour’s economic policy should be understood           
as ​moralised, ​and not solely a technical response to an economic problem.  
Keynesianism does not have only one alternative – economic liberalism. Rather than            
artificially withdrawing from the economy in order to avoid these pitfalls (positive            
neoliberalism), there could be a different, positive democratisation of these relations. Such            
a system would be radically different from either state-centric Keynesianism or ​laissez-faire.​  
Furthermore, had local people led development projects, or at least been better            
consulted, the outcomes of these projects may have been more favourable to local needs.              
This would likely have been the case in West Africa, where locals were aware that               
techniques for mass agriculture developed in Western Europe were unsuitable for the area             
(Utietiang Ukelina 2017a).   
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 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Sterling area management enabled social democracy in Britain 
The sterling area policies enacted by the Attlee governments benefited Britain by helping to              
reduce Britain’s balance of payment deficit with the USA, which threatened to destabilise             
the pound sterling. Retaining the sterling balances of colonies accumulated during the war,             
and continuing to deposit dollar surpluses into these balances, contributed to the reserves             
backing the pound. The development drive meant that there were more dollars entering the              
sterling area, and therefore the sterling reserves, and restriction on imports meant fewer             
dollars were leaving the sterling area. This meant assured the value of the pound and               
provided a counterweight to British spending in the dollar area.  
During this time, Britain’s economic reconstruction still relied on spending in the dollar             
area. Smaller import quotas in the colonies allowed for larger quotas in Britain, which              
allowed for more consumer goods and inputs for industry. The development drive provided             
an alternative source to dollar-spending commodities, and ensured certain primary          
industries were accounted for within the sterling area. This allowed Britain to embrace high              
tech manufacturing. The financial services, however, remained at the heart of the British             
economy, and sterling management ensured that exports of capital did not undermine the             
value of the pound. That the government was able to navigate the sterling crises without               
significant cuts to expenditure allowed them to retain high expenditure throughout the            
Attlee governments and support Britain’s economic reconstruction.  
The Attlee governments were able to pursue their domestic project for social            
democracy through their management of the monetary policies governing the sterling area.            
They avoided needing to redirect public expenditure towards addressing the balance of            
payments crisis at a time when their planned social reforms required an expansion of              
government spending. The cheap finance they obtained from the sterling balances, which            
they were not able to procure at such favourable rates anywhere else, also contributed              
towards the governments’ budgets for social reforms. Furthermore, mobilising the sterling           
area to support the pound, sustained the governments’ ability to borrow from the USA. The               
Attlee governments were also able to import dollar-saving raw materials for the welfare             
state. 
36 
 
 7.2 Sterling area management negatively affected the colonies 
The 1945-1951 Attlee governments actively enforced monetary policies, whether inherited          
or original, that controlled the sterling area. This international economic policy subordinated            
the interests of the dependent colonies to those of Britain and removed the benefits that               
could be gained from membership of the sterling area. While the British did fund colonial               
development projects in some of their dependent colonies, the commodities produced were            
primarily for the export to the dollar area, any surplus from which was held in sterling                
balances in London and not accessible to the local people. The British government             
maintained a system whereby colonial workers increased productivity, worked harder, for        
less pay, in wages capable of buying fewer consumer goods. In the short run, these              
measures permitted a transfer of capital from the Empire’s poorer dollar-earning economies            
to the richer independent Commonwealth nations, who were in trade deficit with the USA              
(Tomlinson 1997: 58). In the long run, this obstructed prospects for equitable development           
in the colonies, particularly in West Africa, where development projects implemented under            
the British were particularly unsuccessful.  
Keynesian historians (Gupta 2002b) emphasise the toll that austerity took in Britain,          
with persistent resource shortages, rationing, and wage repression; meanwhile, the          
government made some compromises on its social reforms, rolling them out gradually, and             
most notably introducing prescription charges in 1951 against their own pledges. British           
workers were also employed towards government-defined activity to ease the balance of            
payment deficit. Britain became more self-sufficient in the production of food than at any              
time since before the industrial revolution, for example. This has led Gupta to conclude that               
British workers “could hardly be described as living off the fat of colonial workers” (Gupta               
2002d: 388). There is no doubt that the poor in Britain continued to experience hardship in                
these years, as working class people who experienced 1947’s unusually harsh winter will             
attest. Yet, however miserable the British experience of austerity in these years, it was              
different in kind to that experienced in the dependent colonies, especially West Africa.             
While austerity in Britain was characterised by the suppression of aggregate demand, like             
that in the colonies, the effects of this in Britain were partly offset by government               
investment. In contrast, austerity in the colonies had the additional aspect of being             
characterised by cuts to government expenditure. In addition, contra Gupta, the fact that             
British workers experienced hardship in these years is insufficient evidence that they did not              
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 benefit from Britain’s imperialist control of the sterling area. In the short run, while British               
workers’ wages were restrained, many workers were employed in higher value industries            
and paid wages that could access far more American wares than could those of a Nigerian                
worker, for example.  
Furthermore, wage restraint was the result of negotiation between the government           
and trade unions. More generally, the future promised to be bright for British workers with               
a Labour government in power, with the express mandate to serve their interests. Full              
employment had already been reached, guaranteed under government policy, and the first            
major social reforms were in place by 1948. Recovery from WWII already looked drastically              
different than the aftermath of WWI. British workers could be confident that present             
hardship would be offset by a better future; colonial workers could have no such faith. They                
had little agency over the form that economic development was taking. That any profit from               
their labour was being held in the London reserves, and that the Attlee governments had               
already retreated on their commitments to grant colonial development finance gave little            
promise that there would be a future payoff for the hardships of the present. The British                
government was not democratically answerable to the people of the colonies, giving            
colonial populations little opportunity to hold the government accountable. Undemocratic,          
and enabling British prosperity to be maintained at the price of colonial living standards, the               
international economic system ran counter to the socialist principles to which the            
government was explicitly committed.  
Deeper historical research into particular areas of the British Empire is continually            
improving our understanding of the effects of the British policy on sterling on the              
dependent colonies (Schenk 2018: 12), for instance Sutton’s (2015) work on Malaya and             
Utietiang Ukelina’s (2017c) work on Nigeria. As Hinds (2001) and Krozewski (2001) note,             
some of the data for exact figures on the effects of British policy are imprecise due to                 
incomplete records having been made at the time, presenting a possible limit to the              
research presented here.  
 
7.3 The Attlee government did not fundamentally alter capitalism 
The Attlee governments’ use of Keynesian measures of economic planning was in many             
ways successful, increasing productivity out of fewer resources, as the figures for the British              
economic recovery attest. The years following the end of WWII bore little resemblance to           
38 
 
 those in the wake of WWI. From a British perspective, the government seemed to have               
found a way to run the economy in a far more efficient way than traditional               
British ​laissez-faire, ​with a novel, benign form of capitalism emerging from the ashes of             
WWII​. ​An efficient, fairer and inclusive economy portended the development of a           
more ​just ​society.  However, we have seen how the Keynesian toolkit, of which the         
government made novel use, did not fundamentally reshape the capitalist system so much             
as capture the benefits of a market economy for British people. The British economy’s              
apparent efficiency was dependent on imperialist exploitation, which seriously undermines          
the idea that the governments’ economic policy was a step towards social justice. A              
judgement on the Attlee governments’ record that takes into account the effects of their              
policy on a global, rather than solely national, level therefore reveals that the social             
democratic variant of capitalism built by the Attlee governments may have made more             
efficient use of scarce resources, but hardly made a more ​just ​use of them, and they failed               
to genuinely remove the rough edges from the capitalist world system.  
Despite the orthodox interpretation of Attlee’s monetary policies as being pragmatic,           
technocratic and, therefore, apolitical, these policies were political in the sense that there             
was debate around these policies, and the sense that the interests of different groups were               
at stake. The implementation of these monetary policies in order to protect the British              
public was to the political benefit of the Labour Party, and was enabled by their political                
power over the sterling area. Shilliam’s observation that Attlee’s government viewed their           
constituency as being the White British Working Class in particular, rather than the working              
class more widely conceived, provides some insight into how Labour was able to reconcile              
an imperialist, capitalist economic system with principles of social democracy. The Labour            
governments were able to rationalise away their failure to protect the interests of working             
people outside the British Isles by consoling themselves with the idea that non-White British             
citizens were essentially undeserving of the same protections, thus a historian that accepts             
that the government was obliged to prioritise the welfare of British citizens residing in the               
British Isles should be aware that the contemporary justification for this limit was grounded              
in racist ideology. 
This also presents a problem for the very idea of social democracy. While a moral               
commitment to ‘social justice’ guides social democratic policy, this universal moral value            
conflicts with the commitment to protect a particular group of people that is inherent in             
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 governing a nation-state. This case is a useful example of where the commitment to              
protecting the nation (or what is perceived as the nation), can conflict with and compromise              
moving towards a more socially-just state of affairs at a global level.  
A thorough understanding of the relation of Attlee’s social democracy to capitalism             
and imperialism, and speculating on alternative courses of action, is therefore not just             
useful for the historiographical purpose of improving our understanding of this period of             
global history, but will also allow us to better judge whether their failings were a failure of                 
governance or had their origins in the nature of the global economy. This would enable us to                 
ensure that future social democracies avoid the same mistakes; or, at worst, signify that              
social democracies can threaten global social justice, even if they can improve standards of            
living within a particular nation. If the global political economy’s structure prevented the             
Attlee governments’ abilities to pursue economic efficiency and social justice on a wider             
scale, the question arises of whether social democratic ideals – in their more universalised,              
globally-applying form – are actually realisable from within a globalised capitalist world            
system; and as such, whether the social democratic nation state is an appropriate vehicle to               
pursue social justice and economic efficiency; or indeed, whether economic efficiency,           
understood as a functioning market economy, is really compatible with social justice at all. 
 
7.4 Implications for the present day 
This case has implications for our understanding of global political economy and social             
justice on a global level. Although we now live in a nominally postcolonial era, some aspects                
of the governments’ imperialism in this period have parallels in the present day.  
The Attlee governments were able to “outsource” austerity because of          
their privileged place in the global political economic system. While we have seen that the             
threat of coercive power was ever lurking in the background, the government were able to               
shift the obligation for fiscal discipline onto other nations because the management of the              
sterling area was depoliticised. There is an extensive literature on depoliticisation, but           
further research could be done on how the obligation for austerity can be transposed today               
via economic institutions such as monetary unions. This could both allow us to better              
understand intra-union relations like that between Greece and Germany and the relations          
between states whose currencies are linked via a peg.   
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  Typically, Southern nations tend to consult with Northern-based governments and          
NGOs on good governance and economic development. Within this context, there remains            
the danger that such consultations can effectively be a “depoliticised” means of Northern             
actors securing their own interests by presenting matters of political consequence as           
politically neutral. With regards to economic development, for example, it has been well             
established that development projects which are not led by local people can end up            
reflecting the needs of richer nations rather than local people.  
Furthermore, while the sterling area irrevocably declined, the means by which Britain            
exploited the sterling area are analogous to, and even historically continuous with, some           
international economic relationships of the present day.  Economic relationships between         
wealthy and poorer nations still exist. Political sovereignty does not amount to economic             
sovereignty and does not necessarily discount these nations from experiencing something           
similar. 
This case study demonstrates the risks of forsaking monetary sovereignty for stability.            
In this case, lack of political control allowed dependent colonies to be deprived of the               
primary benefits of using the pound sterling in the first place. This case can therefore               
provide insight into the monetary policy trilemma by positing that the downsides of lacking              
monetary sovereignty can be ugly. Several Central African nations are still in a currency             
union with France. Taylor (2019) argues that this is an expression of neo-colonialism,             
detrimental to the interests of those nations’ citizens. A comparison between such cases             
could both allow a better evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of monetary union for               
the African countries; and serve as a reminder for French governments that their domestic              
policy can have effects on people outside of ​l’Hexagone. ​Since monetary relations between           
states are undemocratised, the risk remains that relations of ‘monetary imperialism’ could          
be reproduced in the present day.  
 The Attlee governments also used monetary policy to alter the terms of trade in              
Britain’s favour. Modern governments would have less agency over this, since global            
governance institutions such as the WTO are arbiters over trade regulations. However,            
although one nation may not be able to exercise complete dominance over them, this case               
has illustrated that the Rules of the Game are deeply political. A negative corollary of this is               
that ideological biases and political biases are permitted to affect the form of the global               
political economy, with potentially harmful effects for the powerless. However, there is a             
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 positive corollary on the other side of the coin. If global economic linkages could be made              
answerable to power, then this could be a means of bringing about a more just state of                
affairs on a global level.   
 With the parallels and continuities between the imperial past and the present day in              
mind, this case suggests that there is good reason to democratise global economic linkages              
which may appear to be solely a matter of economics but are in fact political. This case has                  
demonstrated that the governance of international economic linkages can be used to the             
partial interests of particular nations and groups of people. Making political decisions with           
the power to affect people’s lives the world over, but answerable only to a domestic               
electorate, the Attlee governments were able to wield power arbitrarily through economic           
policy and evade responsibility for it. That in the past 50 years we have not developed                
means of democratising global economic governance should therefore give historians          
familiar with this period in history that are committed to social justice cause for concern.  
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